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Letter to readers
Our first report, in 2011, showed that based on current 
understanding of an allowable carbon budget to keep 
below two degrees of global warming, there is more 
fossil fuel listed on the world’s capital markets than 
can be burned. Two degrees is a widely accepted 
danger threshold for global warming, and many 
governments have already started taking action. In 
our first report on unburnable carbon, we quantified 
for the first time how bad the overshoot is, company 
by company, and stock exchange by stock exchange. 
We showed that nowhere across the financial chain 
do players in the capital markets recognise, much 
less quantify, the possibility that governments will do 
what they say they intend to do on emissions, or some 
fraction of it. We noted how dysfunctional this is, and 
sketched what the players across the financial chain 
would have to do in order to deflate the growing 
carbon bubble, not least the regulators.
In this second report we dig deeper. In so doing we 
are particularly pleased to partner with the Grantham 
Institute and Lord Stern, a leading authority on the 
economics of climate change.
Carbon Tracker’s work is now used by banks such as 
HSBC and Citigroup and the rating agency Standard 
& Poor’s to help focus their thinking on what a carbon 
budget might mean for valuation scenarios of public 
companies. The IEA is conducting a special study 
on the climate-energy nexus which will consider the 
carbon bubble. Together with our allies, we have 
brought it to the attention of the Bank of England’s 
Financial Stability Committee. We await their reaction 
to this analysis with great interest.
In view of all this, and mindful of the stakes in the 
carbon bubble issue, we hope that our second 
global report will prove useful to as wide as possible 
a constituency. We recognize that we are dealing 
with a risk mitigation exercise that begs involvement 
well beyond capital-markets research analysts and 
economists. Given the stakes for pension value, for 
example, should the carbon bubble go on inflating, 
the general public should certainly be concerned. 
Accordingly, we welcome wide echoing of the 
unburnable carbon message by campaigners since 
our first report, notably in Bill McKibben’s much 
quoted August 2012 article in Rolling Stone Magazine, 
‘Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math’, and the ‘350.
org’ campaign based on it. We commend that public 
engagement. We hope our deeper analysis in this 
report will fuel more.
Jeremy Leggett and Mark Campanale
Chairman and Founding Director
Carbon Tracker
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Executive Summary
 
Using all fossil fuels will breach the global 
carbon dioxide budget  
In 2010, governments confirmed in the Cancun 
Agreement that emissions should be reduced to avoid 
a rise in global average temperature of more than 
2°C above pre-industrial levels, with the possibility 
of revising this down to 1.5°C. The modelling used 
in previous analyses by Carbon Tracker and the IEA 
showed that the carbon budget for a 2°C scenario 
would be around 565 – 886 billion tonnes (Gt) of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) to 2050. This outcome assumes 
that non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. 
methane and nitrous oxide) remain high. 
This budget, however, is only a fraction of the carbon 
embedded in the world’s indicated fossil fuel reserves, 
which amount to 2,860GtCO2. A precautionary 
approach means only 20% of total fossil fuel reserves 
can be burnt to 2050. As a result the global economy 
already faces the prospect of assets becoming 
stranded, with the problem only likely to get worse 
if current investment trends continue - in effect, 
a carbon bubble. 
Stress-testing the carbon budgets
Carbon Tracker, in collaboration with the Grantham 
Research Institute for Climate Change and the 
Environment at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science, has conducted new analysis to 
stress-test the carbon budgets. This analysis estimates 
that the available budget is 900GtCO2 for an 80% 
probability to stay below 2°C and 1075GtCO2 for a 
50% probability, confirming that the majority of fossil 
fuel remains are unburnable.  
This CO2 budget is higher as it assumes greater 
reductions in non-CO2 emissions, such as methane, 
which have a higher global warming potential. In other 
words, applying larger CO2 budgets depends on 
further action to reduce non-CO2 emissions in areas 
such as waste and agriculture. 
The research also examines what alternative 
temperature targets could mean for the amount of 
fossil fuels that can be burnt. The analysis concludes 
that even a less ambitious climate goal, like a 3°C rise 
in average global temperature or more, which would 
impose significantly larger impacts on our society and 
economy, would still imply significant constraints on 
our use of fossil fuel reserves between now and 2050.
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) doesn’t 
change the conclusions
CCS technology offers the potential for extending the 
budgets for the combustion of fossil fuels. Applying 
the IEA’s idealised scenario - which assumes a certain 
level of investment that is not yet secured - extends 
the budgets to 2050 only by 125GtCO2.    
The budget is constrained beyond 2050
Achieving a 2°C scenario means only a small amount 
of fossil fuels can be burnt unabated after 2050. In 
the absence of negative emissions technologies, the 
carbon budget for the second half of the century 
would only be 75GtCO2 to have an 80% probability 
of hitting the 2°C target. This is equivalent to just over 
two years of emissions at current levels. As a result, 
the idea that there could be a fossil fuel renaissance 
post-2050 is without foundation.
Listed companies face a carbon budget deficit
If listed fossil fuel companies have a pro-rata 
allocation of the global carbon budget, this would 
amount to around 125 - 275GtCO2, or 20 - 40% 
of the 762GtCO2 currently booked as reserves. The 
scale of this carbon budget deficit poses a major 
risk for investors. They need to understand that 60 - 
80% of coal, oil and gas reserves of listed firms 
are unburnable.
The London and New York stock markets 
are getting more carbon-intensive
The carbon embedded on the New York market is 
dominated by oil. The level of embedded carbon has 
increased by 37% since 2011. London is more coal 
focused, increasing its total CO2 exposure by 7% over 
the same period. But other markets have higher levels 
of embedded carbon compared with their overall size, 
notably Sao Paulo, Hong Kong and Johannesburg. 
Markets in the south and east are raising capital 
primarily for coal development.
Capital spent on finding and developing more 
reserves is largely wasted
To minimise the risks for investors and savers, capital 
needs to be redirected away from high-carbon 
options. However, this report estimates that the 
top 200 oil and gas and mining companies have 
allocated up to $674bn in the last year for finding 
and developing more reserves and new ways of 
extracting them. The bulk of this expenditure was 
derived from retained earnings – pointing to the duty 
of shareholders to exercise stewardship over these 
funds so that they are deployed on financially gainful 
opportunities consistent with climate security.  
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New business models are required
At the current rate of capital expenditure, the next 
decade will see over $6trn will be allocated to 
developing fossil fuels. With a limited and declining 
carbon budget, much of this risks being wasted on 
unburnable assets. Listed companies have interests 
in undeveloped fossil fuel resources which would 
double the market burden of embedded carbon 
to 1541GtCO2. The current balance between funds 
being returned to shareholders, capital invested in 
low-carbon opportunities and capital used to develop 
more reserves, needs to change. The conventional 
business model of recycling fossil fuel revenues into 
replacing reserves is no longer valid.
Risk needs redefining
Currently the investment process tends to define 
risk as deviation from the performance of market 
benchmarks such as indices. As a result, investors 
and their advisers fear underperformance of their 
portfolio (relative to a financial benchmark) far higher 
than the risk of absolute loss of value for fossil fuel 
sectors. More attention needs to be focused on the 
fundamental value at risk in the low-carbon transition.
Valuation and ratings aren’t routinely pricing 
stranded assets
The 200 fossil fuel companies analysed here have 
a market value of $4trn and debt of $1.5trn. Asset 
owners and investment analysts have begun 
to investigate the implications of unburnable 
carbon. Analysis from HSBC suggests that equity 
valuations could be reduced by 40 - 60% in a low 
emissions scenario. In parallel, the bonds of fossil 
fuel companies could also be vulnerable to ratings 
downgrades, as recently illustrated by Standard & 
Poor’s. Such downgrades would result in companies 
paying higher rates to borrow capital, or if the rating 
drops below investment grade they could struggle 
to refinance their debt. 
Financial models that only rely on past 
performance are an inadequate guide 
for investors
However, neither equity nor credit markets are 
systematically pricing in this risk in their financial 
models. An implicit assumption is that the fossil 
fuels owned by listed companies will go on to be 
developed and sold and the capital released used 
to replace reserves with new discoveries. In the 
context of a declining carbon budget, these valuation 
models provide an inadequate guide for investors 
and need to be recalibrated. 
Do the maths better
Institutional investors need better and more 
future oriented investment appraisal to determine 
a fair assessment of their investment risks and 
opportunities. Reserves replacement ratios could 
become reserves redundancy ratios going forward. 
Performance metrics that have served in the past 
to value companies and incentivise management are 
being turned on their head. Financial intermediaries 
from analysts to actuaries need to stress-test the value 
at risk against a range of future emissions scenarios 
to give asset owners a more forward-looking risk 
analysis. This requires asset owners to demand 
valuation models from their investment advisers 
which address a range of potential outcomes, 
rather than just business as usual.
Regulators and investors need to review 
their approach to systemic risks 
The systemic risks threatening the stability of financial 
markets related to unburnable carbon are growing 
more entrenched since 2011, not less. The markets 
appear unable to factor in the long-term shift to a low-
carbon economy into valuations and capital allocation. 
In a context where market participants are driven by 
short-term metrics, there is a need for regulators to 
review their approach to the systemic risks posed 
by climate change. Improved transparency and 
risk management are essential to the maintenance 
of orderly markets, avoiding wasted capital and 
catastrophic climate impacts.
 |   6
RECOMMENDATIONS
This report makes 
recommendations for action 
by governments, financial 
intermediaries, institutional 
investors and citizens:
Finance ministers:
Initiate an international 
process to incorporate climate 
change into the assessment and 
management of systemic risk in 
capital markets, working with bodies 
such as the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
The G20 could be the appropriate 
forum to drive this process.
Individuals:
Engage with your pension 
and mutual funds about how 
they are addressing climate risk, and 
ensure they have a strategy to manage 
the potential for wasted capital and 
stranded assets.
Engage with the managers of your 
pension and mutual funds so that 
they adopt a carbon budget 
approach to climate risk and 
capital allocation.
Actuaries: 
Review the asset-
liability models used 
to value pensions 
to factor in the 
probabilities of 
different emissions 
scenarios. 
Investment advisers: 
Redefine risk to reflect the value 
at risk from potential stranded 
assets in clients’ portfolios based 
on the probability of future 
scenarios, rather than the risk 
of deviating from the investment 
benchmark.
Ratings agencies: 
Rise to the challenge of 
integrating systematic 
assessment of climate 
risk into sector 
methodologies to 
provide forward 
looking analysis.
Financial regulators:
Require companies to disclose the 
potential emissions of CO2 embedded in 
fossil fuel reserves. 
Review the embedded CO2 in reserves 
and report to international regulators and 
legislative bodies on their assessment of 
potential systemic risks.
Require companies to explain in 
regulatory filings how their business 
model is compatible with achieving 
emissions reductions given the 
associated reductions in price and 
demand that could result.
Analysts: 
Develop alternative indicators 
which stress-test valuations 
against the potential that future 
performance will not replicate 
the past. 
Produce alternative research 
which prices in the impact 
and probabilities of different 
emissions scenarios. 
Investors:
Express demand to regulators, analysts, 
ratings agencies, advisers and actuaries for them 
to stress-test their respective contributions to the 
financial system against climate and emissions risks, 
particularly valuation and risk assumptions.
Challenge the strategies of companies which are using 
shareholder funds to develop high cost fossil fuel 
projects; review the cash deployment of companies 
whose strategy is to continue investing in exploring for 
and developing more fossil fuels and seek its return; 
reduce holdings in carbon-intensive companies and use 
re-balanced, carbon-adjusted indices as performance 
benchmarks; redistribute funds to alternative 
opportunities aligned with climate stability.
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Foreword by Lord Stern
This report shows very clearly the gross inconsistency 
between current valuations of fossil fuel assets and 
the path governments have committed to take in 
order to manage the huge risks of climate change.
If we burn all current reserves of fossil fuels, we will 
emit enough CO2 to create a prehistoric climate, 
with Earth’s temperature elevated to levels not 
experienced for millions of years. Such a world would 
be radically different from today, with changes in the 
intensity and frequency of extreme events, such as 
floods and droughts, higher sea levels re-drawing the 
coastlines of the world, and desertification re-defining 
where people can live. These impacts could lead to 
mass migrations, with the potential for widespread 
conflict, threatening economic growth and stability.
Governments have started to recognise the scale 
of the risks posed by unmanaged climate change 
and have already agreed to reduce annual global 
emissions to avoid global warming of more than 2°C. 
In late 2015, governments are expected to gather 
in Paris at the annual United Nations climate change 
summit to sign a treaty that will commit everyone 
to action that will achieve this aim.
Carbon capture and storage technology could, in 
theory, allow fossil fuels to be burned in a way that 
is consistent with the aim of reducing emissions. 
However, this report shows that even a scenario for 
its deployment that is currently considered optimistic 
would only make a marginal difference to the amount 
of fossil fuels that can be consumed by 2050.
Smart investors can already see that most fossil fuel 
reserves are essentially unburnable because of the 
need to reduce emissions in line with the global 
agreement. They can see that investing in companies 
that rely solely or heavily on constantly replenishing 
reserves of fossil fuels is becoming a very risky 
decision.
But I hope this report will mean 
that regulators also take note, 
because much of the embedded 
risk from these potentially toxic 
carbon assets is not openly 
recognised through current 
reporting requirements.
The financial crisis has shown what happens when 
risks accumulate unnoticed. So it is important that 
companies and regulators work together to openly 
declare and quantify these valuation risks associated 
with carbon, allowing investors and shareholders 
to consider how best to manage them.
If these valuation risks are made more transparent, 
companies that currently specialise in fossil fuels 
will be able to develop new business models that 
take into account the fact that demand for their 
products will decline steeply over the next decades, 
and to consider their options for diversifying in order 
to maintain their value. Investors will also be able to 
consider whether it is better to stay with high-carbon 
assets, or instead seek new opportunities in those 
businesses that are best positioned gain in a low 
carbon economy.
This report provides investors and regulators with 
the evidence they need that serious risks are growing 
for high-carbon assets. It should help them to better 
manage these risks in a timely and effective way.
Professor Lord Stern of Brentford, Chair, Grantham 
Research Institute on Climate Change and the 
Environment, London School of Economics and 
Political Science
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Introduction 
The diagram below shows the financial flows that form a cycle reliant on the 
continued emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels. This report explores 
this relationship further to demonstrate some of the feedback effects of keeping 
emissions within an appropriate carbon budget. It sets out how the current financial 
system needs to adapt to ensure it can reflect the growing risk of wasted capital 
and stranded assets.
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1. Global CO2 budget 
1.1 What are CO2 budgets?
Global warming is driven by increases in atmospheric 
levels of greenhouse gases (GHGs), primarily carbon 
dioxide (CO2) from the burning of fossil fuels. To a first 
approximation, the cumulative annual emissions over 
any particular period will determine the change in 
concentration, and therefore the amount of warming. 
This means that for any particular rise in temperature, 
there is a budget for emissions of greenhouse gases, 
including CO2, which cannot be exceeded in order 
to avoid temperature rising above a target threshold. 
The higher the budget, the lower the likelihood of 
restricting warming to a particular level. 
This analysis focuses on budgets for CO2 only – 
hereafter referred to as carbon budgets. (This is 
different to the UK Government’s carbon budget, 
which includes all greenhouse gases.) Each carbon 
budget is associated with a probability of not 
exceeding a particular temperature threshold. This 
reflects the degree of uncertainty that is inevitable 
when projecting such complex systems decades 
into the future. 
 
The international climate policy agenda
Governments have recognised the need to manage 
the future risks of climate change by reducing 
emissions of greenhouse gases, primarily CO2. In 
2010, governments agreed at a United Nations 
climate change conference that emissions should be 
reduced to avoid a rise in global average temperature 
of more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels, with 
the possibility of revising this down to 1.5°C. The 
target of 2°C has been set because it is recognised 
from the scientific evidence that the risks of very 
severe impacts, such as large and irreversible rises 
in global sea levels, reach unacceptable levels at 
higher temperatures. Governments are now planning 
to agree a new international treaty in 2015 to tackle 
climate change, which may include targets for global 
annual emissions in order to limit the rise in average 
temperature.
This chapter looks at the following questions:
1. What carbon budgets could be set?
Each temperature target implies a different carbon 
budget. Here we explore the carbon budgets for 
temperature rises of 1.5, 2.0, 2.5 and 3.0°C. For each 
temperature rise we provide budgets which give 
a 50% probability and an 80% probability of limiting 
global warming to that level. 
2. What period do the carbon budgets cover?
Most policy discussions focus on the reduction 
in annual emissions that are required by 2050. 
However, emissions after 2050 also matter for global 
temperatures. Here we consider CO2 budgets for 2000 
to 2049 and for 2050 to 2100.
3. How much difference could carbon capture 
and storage make?
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a technology 
which prevents CO2 from the burning of fossil fuels 
from entering the atmosphere. Therefore, CCS has 
the potential to increase the amount of fossil fuels that 
can be burned without exceeding the carbon budget 
for a particular temperature threshold. We examine 
the extent to which an idealistic scenario for the 
development and deployment of CCS affects 
carbon budgets.
Determining probabilities
There are ranges of uncertainty relating to a number 
of factors that determine the carbon budget for 
a particular temperature threshold, including:
•  Climate sensitivity (ie a property of the climate 
system that determines how much global 
temperature rises in response to a doubling of CO2 
levels in the atmosphere);
•  Carbon cycle feedbacks (the extent to which 
emissions of CO2 from burning fossil fuels are 
absorbed by the oceans and land or remain in the 
atmosphere);
•  Aerosol levels (burning fossil fuels also releases 
sulphur dioxide and other particles which cause 
   a cooling effect that diminishes the warming effect 
   of greenhouse gases);
•  Sources of CO2 other than the burning of fossil fuels, 
(particularly changes in land use and forests).
The assumptions that are made about these factors 
are outlined here and described in more detail in an 
accompanying technical paper.
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Alternative assumptions
As with all analysis – whether financial or environmental – there is a need for 
some fundamental assumptions around the parameters which set the framework. 
In finance, different analysts will use different discount rates or future commodity 
prices. Similarly the factors which determine carbon budgets can be adjusted to 
reflect the latest thinking. Each version is still valid and users can apply the analysis 
they feel is the most likely to occur.
The modelling conducted for this study has produced larger budgets than 
indicated by the modelling of the 2009 Meinshausen et al study referenced 
in previous Carbon Tracker work and by the International Energy Agency (IEA). 
That approach produced a range of 565 – 886GtCO2 to give 80% - 50% probabilities 
of limiting warming to a two degree scenario (2DS). This study uses the same 
models but applies some alternative assumptions around some of the factors 
identified above. In particular:
•  A higher level of aerosols in the atmosphere which offset some of the warming 
effect of GHGs;
•  Greater reductions in non-CO2 GHGs (which have higher global warming 
potential) - this allows for higher emissions of CO2 but results in the same overall 
warming effect.
If it proves more feasible to apply non-CO2 mitigation measures, (for example, 
capturing and reusing methane from landfill or low-carbon agriculture techniques), 
this could increase the budget available for CO2 emissions. Using these alternative 
assumptions provides a useful reference point to validate the overall conclusions 
of previous work that the majority of fossil fuels cannot be burnt unmitigated 
if we are to restrict global warming to the 2DS. 
1.2 Analysis of carbon budgets 
Carbon budgets for different temperature thresholds
The following are the fossil fuel carbon budgets from 2013 to 2049, taking 
into account annual emissions so far this century: 
Maximum temperature rise (°C)
Fossil fuel carbon budget 
2013-2049 (GtCO2)
Probability of not exceeding 
temperature threshold
50% 80%
1.5 525 -
2.0 1075 900
2.5 1275 1125
3.0 1425 1275
From these results, there is already less than an 80% chance of limiting global 
warming to 1.5°C. These carbon budgets are taken from models which run 
beyond 2050, and therefore have implications for this later period. 
Post-2050 carbon budgets 
Although the primary focus here is on carbon budgets from fossil fuels and other 
sources for the period between 2013 and 2049, the budget beyond 2049 is also 
important for this analysis. The following are the total CO2 budgets (including non-
fossil fuel elements) for each temperature threshold for the period from 2050 to 2100.
Maximum temperature rise (°C)
Total Carbon budget 
2050–2100 (GtCO2)
Probability of not exceeding 
temperature threshold
50% 80%
1.5 25 -
2.0 475 75
2.5 1175 650
3.0 1875 1200
Fossil fuel use carbon budget 2050 - 2100 
(GtCO2) (50th percentile)
Fossil fuel use carbon budget 2013 - 2049 
(GtCO2) (50th percentile)
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50% probability budgets pre- and post-2050
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For those with interests in fossil fuels, this clarifies that the budget does not get 
reset in 2050 as the cumulative effect of industrial emissions is still present. This 
confirms the fact that these reserves cannot just be burnt later if we are to limit 
global warming this century. Indeed, for the 1.5°C and 2°C targets, there can be 
very little emissions beyond 2050. For some emissions pathways, land use and 
forestry may contribute net negative emissions of CO2 between 2050 and 2100, 
so the figures here may not be the upper limit of the carbon budget for fossil fuels.
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Fossil fuel use carbon budget 2050 - 2100 
(GtCO2) (50th percentile)
Fossil fuel use carbon budget 2013 - 2049 
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1.3 The potential for CCS to 
extend the carbon budget
 
CCS technology has been fitted to a number 
of demonstration plants around the world, with the 
Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute (GCCSI) 
(2012) reporting there are eight large-scale projects 
currently operating, together storing about 23 million 
tonnes of CO2 each year. A further eight projects are 
currently under construction, which the GCCSI 
estimates would increase the annual storage of CO2 
to about 36 million tonnes by 2015 (ie about 2.25 
million tonnes per year stored on average by 
each project).
The International Energy Agency (2012) described 
technology options and policy pathways that, 
according to its models, ‘ensure an 80% chance of 
limiting long-term temperature increase to 2°C’. This 
included an idealised scenario in which CCS prevents 
125GtCO2 from the burning of fossil fuels from 
entering the atmosphere between 2015 and 2050.  
In the idealised scenario, the amount of CO2 
prevented annually from entering the atmosphere 
by carbon capture and storage technology increases 
from 0.3GtCO2 in 2020 to 8GtCO2 in 2050. The graph 
compares emissions removed by carbon capture and 
storage in the idealised scenario with an emissions 
pathway that offers about an 80% chance of not 
exceeding a warming of more than 2°C.
Given that the average annual rate of storage in 
2015 is projected by the Global Carbon Capture 
and Storage Institute (2012) to be about 2.25 million 
tonnes for 16 CCS projects, a total of nearly 3800 CCS 
projects would need to be operating by 2050 under 
the idealised scenario.
Each carbon budget indicated for the probability 
of a particular warming outcome would only be 
extended by 125GtCO2 to 2050 with an optimistic 
level of CCS in place.
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Carbon capture and storage is still far from being 
a commercial technology that is widely deployed. 
Although it theoretically offers a way for an unlimited 
amount of fossil fuels to be burned without exhausting 
budgets, the relatively limited deployment of CCS that 
is expected before 2050, even in an idealised scenario, 
means that it is unlikely to significantly increase the 
amount of fossil fuels that can be burned. For these 
scenarios even with full investment in CCS, it extends 
the carbon budget for the 2DS by only 12-14% 
(50-80% probability).
For these scenarios even with full 
investment in CCS, it extends the 
carbon budget for the 2DS by 
only 12-14% 
It is also important to note that CCS technology 
is only really being explored for natural gas and coal, 
and is not currently considered suitable for use with 
oil in transport.
 
 Conclusions
•  Carbon budgets are a very useful tool to understand 
the level of unabated fossil fuel emissions that 
can occur over the next few decades to meet 
temperature rise thresholds.
•  Governments may agree a budget for CO2 and other 
greenhouse gases as part of a new international 
climate change treaty in 2015.
•  If more action is taken to reduce non-CO2 emissions, 
this gives a more generous fossil fuel CO2 emissions 
budget of 900GtCO2 to give an 80% chance of 
achieving a 2DS.
•  Even if investment in CCS is stepped up in line with 
the IEA’s idealised scenario, it has limited potential 
to extend carbon budgets by the time it can be 
applied at scale. 2DS budgets are only increased 
   by 12-14% if full investment is realised.
•  Even with allocating more budget to CO2 emissions 
rather than other GHGs, and an idealised level 
    of CCS in place, the majority of fossil fuel reserves 
cannot be burnt if we want a decent chance of 
limiting global warming to 2°C.
•  The concept of a carbon budget gives a new 
baseline against which reserves can be matched, 
to see what proportion of fossil fuels owned by 
public companies can be developed and burnt 
unmitigated. This has implications for the way 
investment banks and investors value these 
companies, the way companies disclose the viability 
of their reserves and their future decisions to explore 
and develop more fossil fuels.
Recommendation
•  The implications of CO2 budgets are profound 
    and international climate policymakers have a role 
    to play in translating the implications into financial 
and economic decision-making. 
Methodology
•   A number of emissions pathways from previous 
studies are used, (Bowen and Ranger 2009; 
Ranger et al. 2010), as well as some new ones 
developed for this study.
•   The climate outcome for each pathway used 
in this study was validated using the MAGICC6 
climate model (at http://live.MAGICC.org; 
Meinshausen et al, 2011).
•   The climate settings of Meinshausen et al 
(2009) in MAGICC6 are used for analysing the 
emissions pathways.
•   The assumptions are represented as probability 
distributions, which means that the models 
produce a range of estimated temperature rises 
for each pathway for annual global emissions.
•   The outputs are focused on the 50% and 
80% probabilities of delivering a particular 
temperature.
•   None of the pathways in this study involve net 
negative annual emissions of greenhouse gases 
up to 2100.
•   It is assumed 7.3% of total CO2 emissions are 
generated by land use, land-use change and 
forestry for carbon budgets up to 2050.
•   Emissions for 2000-2012 for fossil fuels are 
estimated to be about 400GtCO2.
•   Carbon budgets are obtained from best fit lines 
to plots of model emission pathways, and the 
budgets are rounded to the nearest 25GtCO2.
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2. Global listed coal, oil 
and gas reserves and 
resources
This chapter focuses on the following questions:
1. What level of reserves are already owned 
by listed companies; and what further 
reserves are they looking to develop 
into production?
2. How do the reserves levels compare 
with the carbon budgets?
3. How much capital expenditure 
is going towards finding and developing 
more reserves?
4. How are the reserves distributed 
across the world’s stock exchanges? 
5. Which market indices are the most 
carbon intensive?
2.1 Reserves owned by listed 
companies
State ownership: Reserves vs Production
According to the World Energy Outlook 2012, 
the total reserves including state owned assets 
are equivalent to 2860GtCO2. This is already enough 
to take us beyond 3°C of warming. 
Governments own a higher proportion of oil and 
gas reserves (up to 90%) compared to coal reserves 
(around two thirds). However it is worth noting 
that national oil companies do not have the same 
proportion of current production – estimated 
at around 60% of oil and less than 50% of gas. 
This means that listed companies play an even bigger 
role than reserves figures might suggest. They play 
a key role in unlocking state owned assets with the 
technology and capital they can bring.
In order to assess the exposure of institutional 
investors the focus is on the reserves held by 
companies listed on the world’s stock exchanges. 
In addition to looking at those that have a high 
certainty, (P1 oil and gas reserves and coal reserves) 
we have gone one step further than the original 
Unburnable Carbon analysis and analysed the 
potential reserves (P2 oil and gas reserves and coal 
resources) which companies are seeking to develop. 
This demonstrates that the potential size of the 
unburnable carbon – the proportion of reserves owned 
by companies that will have to remain in the ground 
undeveloped - is even larger than previously thought. 
It also shows the intentions of the extractives sector 
if there are no emissions limits in place.
If all of these resources are developed to fruition it 
would double the level of potential CO2 emissions 
listed on the world’s stock exchanges from 762 to 
1541GtCO2. This will require capital in order to 
develop the potential reserves further so that they 
move from the resources / P2 categories to the 
reserves / P1 categories. It is worth noting that the 
proportion of coal to total fossil fuels also increases 
from 36% to 42% when comparing the current reserves 
to potential reserves (see the table below). Therefore, 
the average investor portfolio exposed to listed 
companies is set to become more carbon intensive 
in coming years not less, if this is where capital is 
spent. However, not all of the undeveloped reserves 
have to be brought on stream. Indeed, in a market 
of weakening demand and falling prices, this would 
reduce the viability of reserves.
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281
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2.2 Comparing listed reserves to 
carbon budgets
Listed coal, oil and gas assets that are already 
developed are nearly equivalent to the 80% 2°C 
budget to 2050 of 900GtCO2. As we know, the majority 
of reserves are held by state owned entities. If listed 
companies develop all of the assets they have an 
interest in, these potential reserves would exceed the 
budget to 2050 to give only a 50% chance of achieving 
the 2DS of 1075GtCO2.
Listed companies’ share of the budget
Given that listed companies own around a quarter 
of total reserves (which are equivalent to 2860GtCO2), 
their proportional share of the carbon budgets 
is nowhere near that required to utilise all their 
reserves. This shows that there is a very limited 
budget remaining for listed reserves if we want to 
have a high likelihood of limiting temperatures to the 
lower range as outlined at the international climate 
negotiations. This means that an estimated 65-80% 
of listed companies’ current reserves cannot be burnt 
unmitigated. 
This confirms that the planned activities of just the 
listed extractives companies are enough to go beyond 
having a 50% of achieving a 3DS, without adding in 
state-owned assets. The additional emissions required 
to take us beyond a 2DS to a 2.5DS and then a 3DS 
are relatively small increases. 
If listed companies are allocated 
a pro-rata share of the budget 
– 25% - this leaves them with 
a major carbon budget deficit 
compared to their reserves.
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2.3 How much capital is being 
spent to develop more reserves
In order to develop current reserves more capital will 
have to be deployed. This section gives an indication 
of the level of capital expenditure (CAPEX) by these 
companies to find and develop more reserves. The 
analysis shows that the CAPEX spend (adjusted 
proportionally to revenues from coal, oil and gas) over 
the last 12 months by these 200 companies totalled 
US$674billion. The higher capital costs of the oil 
and gas sector mean that the majority - $593billion - 
was related to this sector, with $81billion related 
to coal operations.
CAPEX breakdown
Detailed breakdowns of the CAPEX budgets were 
not available across all companies. Mining company 
CAPEX was attributed to coal in proportion to the 
revenues from coal. The majority of the oil majors 
CAPEX went on exploration, production and 
refining – ie getting more product to market. There 
is some variation between companies in terms of 
diversification into other energy types, eg wind, solar. 
There is limited transparency over R&D budgets which 
could be used for anything from developing new 
technologies to extract unconventional hydrocarbons 
to improving battery technologies.
Wasted capital?
If CAPEX continues at the same level over the next 
decade it would see up to $6.74trillion in wasted 
capital developing reserves that is likely to become 
unburnable. This would drive an even greater 
divergence between a 2DS and the position of the 
financial markets. This has profound implications for 
asset owners with significant holdings in fossil fuel 
stocks. It is particularly acute for those companies with 
large CAPEX plans that continue to sink shareholder 
funds into the development of additional new reserves 
that are incompatible with a low-carbon pathway.
Returning cash
In contrast, the same companies paid US$126billion 
in dividends to their shareholders over the last 12 
months, (US$105billion from oil and gas; US$21billion 
from coal).  
The companies involved in fossil fuel extraction are 
spending five times more on seeking new reserves 
than they are returning capital to shareholders. 
Shareholders are already starting to question whether 
this ratio needs to change. The world has ample coal 
reserves to exceed the carbon budgets required 
to limit global warming. Investors need to start 
questioning why further investment in more 
coal and oil is a useful application 
of funds by these companies where 
a strategy of higher dividend payouts 
and share buy-backs might be more 
appropriate. 
Alternative business model
Unless fossil fuel-based companies 
can come up with an alternative 
business model, then 
they can’t all sustain 
revenues and 
growth. 
In particular this poses a challenge for companies 
focused purely on carbon-intensive activities such 
as coal or oil sands.
If CAPEX continues at the same 
level over the next decade it 
would see up to $6.74trillion 
in wasted capital developing 
reserves that is likely to become 
unburnable.
Estimated annual CAPEX spending 
on developing more reserves
 
$6
74b
n CAPEX per year
Coal Reserves / P1 Oil and Gas Coal Resources / P2 Oil and Gas
762
GtCO2
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2.4 Distribution of coal, oil 
and gas assets across stock 
exchanges
The first map overleaf depicts current reported 
reserves and shows that New York, Moscow and 
London have high concentrations of fossil fuels on 
their exchanges. If the reserves on the Hong Kong, 
Shanghai and Shenzen exchanges are combined 
then China is not far behind. The second map 
indicates the level of potential reserves on each 
exchange. This includes P2 oil and gas reserves 
and coal resources in addition to the reserves 
shown on the first map. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
88% of the CO2 potential listed on the Chinese 
exchanges relates to coal reserves.
Under development
Other exchanges have a significant amount 
of potential reserves under development which 
will increase their exposure if brought into production. 
Johannesburg, Tokyo, Australia, Indonesia, Bangkok 
and Amsterdam would all see their levels more than 
triple if the current prospects have more capital invested 
and are successfully developed into viable reserves. 
Investors and regulators should start questioning the 
validity of new or secondary share issues by companies 
seeking to use the capital to develop further fossil 
fuel assets.
Understanding the value chain
However the implications for investors across these 
exchanges can be very different depending on the 
geography of the reserves that are listed on them, 
and which markets they are reliant on for sales. South 
Africa and Australia both have significant coal deposits 
but have very different demand profiles. South Africa’s 
energy sector is dominated by coal, including the 
conversion of coal to liquids to produce transport 
fuel. This means the coal market is primarily domestic. 
Australia on the other hand exports all around the 
Pacific, and in an increasingly global market. By 
contrast, the United States (US) is considering export 
options due to its dwindling domestic market. 
Investors need to understand the global value 
chains which can link the shares they hold through 
a particular exchange to reserves which could be 
mined in another country with a view to exporting 
to another market. The analysis of coal listed 
in London indicated that one third of the reserves 
were located in Australia. 
This means the following global links for a company 
like Xstrata:
•  The headquarters is in Switzerland; 
• Its primary listing is in London;
•  The majority of its reserves are in Australia and 
South Africa;
•  85% of its production is exported;
•  Major markets include Japan, China, India, Korea, 
Taiwan.
The announcement by China that 
it plans to peak coal use in the 
current five year plan at under 
4billion tonnes per year could 
have major knock-on effects
Investors therefore need to understand the risk from 
alternative technology, emissions regulation, changes 
in demand and price, energy efficiency, water scarcity, 
and any other factors which could change the market 
for coal. For example the announcement by China that 
it plans to peak coal use in the current five year plan at 
under 4bn tonnes per year could have major knock-on 
effects for the increasingly global coal market. Many 
producers’ current growth plans are predicated on 
an unchecked demand from China for coal.
Stranded assets
Many factors – including policies and prices in the 
countries where fossil fuels are extracted, marketed 
and combusted – will affect which particular fossil 
fuel assets turn out to be unburnable. This makes 
identifying potential stranded assets a more complex 
task. However it is clear that taking a systemic view 
is informative – if the global market does not continue 
to grow at the same rate, then the strategies of most 
companies to continue growing production do not 
all add up. 
East-west split
The maps show the clear split between eastern and 
southern stock exchanges having a high proportion 
of coal, whereas western markets have large amounts 
of oil. There are plenty more coal resources waiting to 
be developed by companies listed in the far east and 
Australia. These could be the stranded assets of the 
future in a carbon-constrained scenario. The limited 
exposure of all markets to gas indicates the poor 
positioning for a low carbon transition using this fuel. 
Moscow dominates the current listed gas reserves, 
with Paris and New York showing potential for growth.
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21Unburnable Carbon 2013: Wasted capital and stranded assets  | 
2.5 Comparison of index intensity
It is clear that some exchanges have a high absolute exposure to coal, oil and 
gas reserves. These are therefore a particular concern for investment risk. But 
in addition, some of the smaller exchanges have a high concentration of fossil 
fuel-based businesses in their indices. We analysed the primary indices associated 
with the top 200 companies analysed. This revealed the following carbon intensive 
funds and benchmarks. 
Indices
Current reserves intensity of index 
(GtCO2 / US$ trillion mkt cap)
MICEX Index (Moscow) 213.39
Athens Stock Exchange General Index 101.44
FTSE MIB INDEX (Italy) 40.89
FTSE 100 (London) 35.86
Budapest Stock Exchange Index 29.95
Bovespa Sao Paulo Stock Exchange 
Index
24.55
Hong Kong Hang Seng Index 24.16
Vienna Stock Exchange Traded Index 23.38
BSE Sensex 30 Index (India) 21.21
S&P/TSX Composite Index (Canada) 19.59
The table summarises the top ten exchanges in terms of existing reserves relative 
to the market capitalisation of the companies on that index. Athens, Italy, Vienna 
and Budapest are small European exchanges with relatively large reserves in their 
index. The presence of Brazil, Hong Kong and India in the top ten shows that the 
emerging markets are also catching up. 
We applied the same analysis to the exposure of indices to potential reserves that 
companies are seeking to develop. The new entrants in the top ten are Australia, 
South Africa and Jakarta. This shows how Australian and Indonesian firms are 
looking to expand their reserves, which contradicts the direction needed to achieve 
carbon budgets. 
Indices
Potential reserves intensity of index 
(GtCO2 / US$ trillion mkt cap)
MICEX Index (Moscow) 395.61
Athens Stock Exchange General Index 101.44
FTSE 100 (London) 90.65
FTSE MIB INDEX (Italy) 74.42
S&P/ASX 200 (Australia) 67.14
FTSE/JSE Africa All Share Index 49.73
Bovespa Sao Paulo Stock Exchange 
Index
47.89
Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite 
Index
47.78
Budapest Stock Exchange Index 47.32
BSE Sensex 30 Index (India) 43.09
Carbon Tracker has been analysing some of the markets with significant and 
growing reserves. In November 2012 we undertook an analysis of South African 
listed coal reserves. This provided a picture of the domestic concentration of the 
issue of unburnable carbon. Current reserves are ample for the ‘required by science 
budget’ indicated in the South African government’s carbon budget research. We 
compared the portfolio of the Government Employee’s Pension Fund (GEPF) to the 
Johannesburg index weighting. The required domestic focus of GEPF as the largest 
investor in South Africa leaves them exposed to this as a systemic risk which they are 
starting to address.
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Conclusions 
•  The amount of fossil fuel reserves owned by listed companies has continued 
   to rise to the equivalent of 762GtCO2. 
•  The level of listed reserves could double to 1541GtCO2 if all of the prospective 
reserves are developed. 
•  If listed companies are allocated their proportion of the carbon budget relative 
   to total reserves (a quarter), they are already around three times their share 
   of the budget to give a reasonable chance of achieving the 2DS.
•  Listed companies have more opportunities to develop coal, than they do oil 
   or gas; giving the markets exposure to the more carbon intensive fossil fuels.
•  Oil, gas and coal mining companies spent $674billion of capital expenditure 
   in the last year seeking to develop more reserves.
•  Analysing absolute levels of exposure, London comes out as the coal capital 
   with New York being the oil financial centre, especially in terms of potential 
   future assets. Regulators in these markets need to take the lead.
•  When looking at carbon intensity, some of the smaller exchanges have high 
    levels of fossil fuels for their size: Brazil, Hong Kong, Johannesburg, India, 
Greece, Italy, Vienna and Budapest.
 
Assumptions: 
• Current reserves: greater than 90% probability of economic extraction 
 and geological certainty. Coal reserves and P1 oil and gas reserves based 
 on best available data from RMG Intierra and Evaluate Energy.
•  Potential reserves: greater than 50% probability of economic extraction 
 and geological certainty. Coal resources and P2 oil and gas reserves based 
 on best available data from RMG Intierra and Evaluate Energy.
•  Six different CO2 factors used to reflect hydrocarbon categories: natural gas; 
conventional oil; oil sands; lignite; sub-bitumous and bitumous coal.
•  Other unconventional energy sources such as shale gas are not reported 
separately. The IPCC has not indicated specific CO2 factors for these types 
 of hydrocarbon. This is therefore considered a conservative estimate.
•  Ownership: the CO2 potential of companies is reduced proportionately 
where a government maintains a significant interest (>10%).
•  Listed subsidiaries/parents: where one listed company owns a percentage 
 of another listed company with reserves, the CO2 potential is split accordingly
 to avoid double counting.
•  Primary exchange: the CO2 is attributed to the primary exchange of the 
 listed equity.
•  Dual listing: the CO2 potential of dual listed companies is split proportionate 
to the market capitalisation on each exchange.
•  CAPEX and dividends data summarises the most recent 12months figures 
reported.
• Currency: all data was converted into US$.
•   Diversified mining companies: where data was available, the figures were 
reduced proportionate to the percentage of revenues from coal.
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3. Evolving the regulation 
of markets for climate risk 
The rapid dislocations in the banking systems and 
subsequent knock-on effects on equity market 
valuations in 2008-2012 arose due to a lack of a clear 
overall understanding of risks rising within financial 
markets. Some sectors – particularly the property 
market, both from the speculative development of 
investment properties and bundling of sub-prime 
mortgages for re-sale – showed an inability for the 
investment banks and rating agencies to satisfactorily 
measure risk. Similarly, the banking system and 
regulators are not yet watching for the warning signals 
we identified in this report – leaving a financial system 
that is still not fit for purpose. 
The rules that guide and govern the operation 
of financial markets need to evolve to address this 
systemic risk. London and New York are the obvious 
places to start given their high exposure to the issue. 
The European Union (EU) also provides overarching 
regulation which could impact the London market. 
This section identifies some opportunities to address 
climate risk through existing processes.
Regulation can evolve through the leadership 
of individual markets as well as through adoption 
by the global body - the International Organisation 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Financial regulators 
have shown they are willing to act to improve 
transparency of risk for specific sectors in light of new 
developments or issues raised by investors. Climate 
risk needs to be next on their list.
3.1 Extractives sector 
requirements
The focus of this analysis on reserves makes it most 
pertinent to the extractives sector. Measures have 
been developed specifically for this sector which 
demonstrate that the regulators are willing to act 
to protect the interests of shareholders and society 
in response to emerging issues. Data specific to this 
sector on reserves could help regulators and investors 
understand the level of systemic climate risk relative 
to carbon budgets. Aspects of their businesses – 
reserves and revenues – are already subject to greater 
scrutiny – emissions potential is a natural extension.
The two simplest indicators of ‘risk’ for regulators 
addressed in this report are inter-connected.They are:
1. Collecting the data on embedded CO2 held 
in the reserves of publically traded companies. 
2. The level of capital expenditure by these 
companies in developing new resources as 
they maintain their reserves replacement ratios. 
The first indicates what levels of reserves might get 
stranded and be subject to impairment; the second 
indicates what valuable cash resources of asset 
owners such as pension funds might be ‘lost’ from 
unproductive capital investment. Taken together, 
both are indicators to regulators as to the systemic 
risk being built up in capital markets from the 
challenge of a carbon-constrained world.
EUROPEAN UNION
The EU has proposed the transparency of payments 
from extractive industries to host governments by 
an amendment to the Transparency Directive. 
LONDON
As a global centre for extractives companies to raise 
capital, the London Stock Exchange has a need 
to maintain its reputations for high standards of 
corporate governance. In order to provide extra 
assurance to investors, new guidance was introduced 
for listed companies in 2009 requiring a ‘competent 
persons review’ of the mineral reserves indicated 
by the company. This ensures that companies listed 
on the exchange cannot overstate their reserves, 
which would imply greater revenues going forward. 
UNITED STATES
In the US, Dodd-Frank went beyond the different parts 
of the financial system to improve the transparency 
of payments to governments by the extractives sector. 
This shows how financial regulators can act to improve 
disclosure. The same approach needs to be applied 
to extractive companies being transparent about the 
CO2 emissions potential of the fossil fuel reserves in 
which they have an interest.
PROPOSAL
•  Requiring all extractives companies to provide 
financial regulators with the CO2 potential of their 
coal, oil and gas reserves would be a first step to 
improving transparency and facilitating monitoring 
of the risk.
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3.2 Financial stability regulations
There have been capital requirements measures 
introduced around the world for financial institutions 
to have a minimum ratio of assets to lending. 
The ability of climate risk to affect 
all sectors, and the huge value 
placed on fossil fuel reserves 
provides an imperative for this 
issue to be actively managed 
to prevent the carbon bubble 
bursting.
EUROPEAN UNION
Basel III is a global, regulatory standard on bank 
capital adequacy, stress-testing and market liquidity 
risk. The European Commission introduced the Basel 
III Accord under the Capital Requirements Directive. 
LONDON
In the UK, the Financial Services Act 2012 created 
the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) at the Bank of 
England. The FPC monitors the levels of capital cover 
and reports on its assessment of risk in its six-monthly 
reviews.
Following engagement by Carbon Tracker and 
a number of financial and environmental stakeholders, 
the Bank of England recognised climate change 
as a potential systemic risk.
As yet no mention has been made of climate change 
risk in these reports. In order for the market to have 
comfort that this risk is being monitored we believe 
that similar indicators should be developed for climate 
risk exposure, indicating the changing balance between 
high and low-carbon assets. At present the analysis 
shows this is heading in the wrong direction, but the 
regulator is not actively managing the situation. 
These are times of change at the Bank of England with 
a new Governor and new structure being introduced 
during Q3 of 2013. This is also an opportunity for the 
new functions tasked with addressing financial stability 
to make sure they have addressed all potential risks. 
UNITED STATES
The Dodd-Frank Act was a diverse mechanism for 
addressing a number of issues across financial stability 
and market transparency. It established the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) which has the 
following remit:
“As established under the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the 
Council provides, for the first time, comprehensive 
monitoring of the stability of our nation’s financial 
system. The Council is charged with identifying 
risks to the financial stability of the United States; 
promoting market discipline; and responding to 
emerging risks to the stability of the United States’ 
financial system.”
The US also has the Comprehensive Capital Analysis 
and Review conducted by the Federal Reserve to 
review and stress-test capital planning processes 
at financial institutions. 
PROPOSAL
•  Regulators responsible for financial stability should 
stress-test reserves levels and production plans 
against a 2°C emissions scenario, and report on the 
current status of their market.
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3.3 Long-termism and equity 
markets
The financial crisis has exposed the short-termism 
that is rife in financial markets. Some efforts to address 
this are already underway which focus on parts of 
the financial system. Investors such as Generation 
Investment Management and corporations such 
as Unilever have already proposed moving away 
from quarterly reporting for example. Share Action 
(formerly Fair Pensions) have been actively seeking 
a clear interpretation of fiduciary duty to encompass 
long-term intergenerational considerations for 
pension fund trustees.
EUROPEAN UNION
The EU launched a three month consultation in March 
2013 on the long-term financing of the sustainable 
economy. This was prompted by a belief that the 
financial crisis has affected the ability of the financial 
sector in Europe to channel savings to long-term 
investment. The EU defines long-term investment 
as spending that enhances the productive capacity 
of the economy. This can include energy, transport 
and communication infrastructures, industrial and 
service facilities, climate change and eco-innovation 
technologies, as well as education and research and 
development. Europe faces large-scale long-term 
investment needs, which are crucial to support 
sustainable growth. 
LONDON
The UK Department for Business Industry and Skills 
(BIS) set up a review by Professor John Kay into ‘UK 
equity markets and long term decision-making’. This 
recognised the ‘market myopia’, which Andy Haldane, 
Executive Director of Financial Stability at the Bank 
of England has spoken of. This review has led to 
further parliamentary scrutiny of the issue by the 
BIS Select Committee. 
A further spin-off is the review by the Law Committee 
to clarify the definition of fiduciary duty. This 
responded to concerns that some fiduciaries (eg 
pension fund trustees) understood their fiduciary 
duties required them to maximise returns over 
a short-time scale, precluding consideration 
of long-term factors which might impact 
on company performance.
UNITED STATES
No explicit regulatory activity in this area was 
identified in the US. The Aspen Institute has been 
active in this area producing guiding principles 
for long term value creation.
PROPOSAL
•  Regulators seeking to develop long-term equity 
markets which can deal with systemic risks should 
use climate change risk as a test case 
 to demonstrate they have succeeded. 
3.4 Corporate disclosure
The development of integrated reporting by the 
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), 
as well as pilot initiatives such as the King Code III 
in South Africa indicate what many believe to be 
the future of corporate reporting. This provides 
an opportunity to bring together the consideration 
of climate risk with the reporting of reserves and the 
explanation of business strategy. Other markets 
are not as advanced but still offer opportunities 
to address climate risk now it is clearly it is relevant 
to strategy and business models.
EUROPEAN UNION
The EU is currently developing proposals to reform 
non-financial reporting under the Accounting 
Directive. This is likely to require in the annual report 
a ‘description of the principal risks and uncertainties’ 
that a company faces. This should be ‘a balanced 
and comprehensive analysis of the development 
and performance of the company’s business and of 
its position, consistent with the size and complexity 
of the business’. Even in this generic form Carbon 
Tracker would argue that climate change risk should 
be addressed by companies whose business model 
is dependent on fossil fuels. Further guidance and 
specific references to environmental issues may be 
developed to prompt improvements in disclosure. 
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LONDON
The UK government will introduce revised reporting 
requirements for listed companies in October 2013 
covering greenhouse gas emissions; key performance 
indicators; and narrative reporting. 
The proposed greenhouse gas requirements are 
a one size fits all approach. This has not incorporated 
the proposal by Carbon Tracker that extractive 
companies should report on the emissions potential 
of the reserves they have an interest in. As a result the 
most material emissions for many firms which relate 
to their supply chains or the market for their products 
will not be subject to the mandatory GHG reporting 
requirements.
The greenhouse gas reporting guidance references 
approaches such as the Climate Change Risk 
Framework (CCRF) developed by the Carbon 
Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB). Applying 
the CCRF would help companies provide a more 
complete picture of their risk exposure and 
management.
However the requirements of the Companies Act should 
in theory result in companies reporting on how climate 
change affects their strategy and business model. 
The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report 
and Directors’ Report) draft Regulations 
2013
In the case of a quoted company the strategic 
report must, to the extent necessary for an 
understanding of the development, performance 
or position of the company’s business, include:
(a) a description of the company’s strategy; 
(b) a description of the company’s business model; 
(c) the main trends and factors likely to affect the 
future development, performance and position 
of the company’s business, and; 
(d) information about. 
  (i) environmental matters (including the 
impact of the company’s business on the 
environment); 
  (ii) the company’s employees, and; 
  (iii) social, community and human rights issues, 
 including information about any policies of  
 the company in relation to those matters and  
 the effectiveness of those policies. 
UNITED STATES
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
issued guidance on the materiality of climate change 
risk to corporations. This has provided a reference 
point for investors who have brought climate related 
shareholder resolutions at coal, oil and gas, utilities 
and financial companies. The SEC also requires oil 
companies to provide the net present value (NPV10) of 
their proven reserves in annual filings for shareholders. 
This requires directors to take a view on assumptions 
regarding commodity prices, discount rates and the 
viability of the reserves. 
The fact that some investors feel the need to file 
resolutions to extract information on climate risks 
demonstrates that companies are not voluntarily 
providing sufficient information under the current 
regimes. This has been confirmed by CERES’ surveys 
of corporate disclosure in this area.
PROPOSAL
•  Regulators should require companies to explain how 
their business model is compatible with achieving 
emissions reduction targets.
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4. Implications for equity valuation and 
credit ratings
The scale of these looming carbon risks need to be incorporated into the 
pricing of equities and rating of bonds to enable investors to align their 
assets with a low-carbon economy.
4.1 Equity
Market capitalisation
The market value of the 200 listed companies analysed with the largest fossil fuel 
reserves totalled around US$4trillion at the end of 2012. This was split 16% to coal 
activities and 84% to oil and gas. The following section looks at the oil and gas, 
mining and utilities sectors in turn to understand what sticking to carbon budgets 
means for how shares are valued.
Oil and gas valuation
•  Current valuations are based on the full exploitation of proven reserves 
   at a consistent production rate and price.
•  Post peak demand, the fundamentals of price and demand are more significant 
than the reduction in consumption, with significant impact on the market value. 
Low-cost, low-carbon assets become preferable.
•  Valuations based on historical return on capital performance assume margins 
  can be maintained, which becomes increasingly difficult as prices contract 
  with demand.
Falling off the end of the cost curve
Lower demand and prices would logically lead to projects at the high end of the 
cost curve not receiving a final investment decision, disadvantaging those with 
high exposure. However this logic is not always consistently applied, and 
investors need to challenge the continued pursuit of potentially unprofitable 
projects before costs are sunk.
HSBC: Oil & Carbon Revisited 
(January 2013) Summary
In a low-carbon economy, oil demand could be reduced relatively quickly given 
the availability of cost-effective technologies to improve transport efficiency; 
gas demand would continue to grow, though at a slower rate. Lower than 
expected demand would result in a falling oil price and $50/barrel is modelled 
as a ceiling test. The most important impact on market values would flow 
from the cut to the oil price, so that the combined value at risk ranges from 
40-60% of market capitalisation. For investors, the focus should be on low-cost 
producers that can prosper in a low-price environment, and on those with 
a bias to gas rather than oil sands. 
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Mining valuation
•  It was always a case of when, not if, a commodities boom would come to an end, 
but still many companies are not well positioned for the downturn. Addressing 
climate change is very similar – a case of when, not if; yet many companies are 
delaying making the transition.
•  Longer term discounted cash flows can pick up the impact on revenues 
   of reduced demand for coal, but shorter term models may not.
•  CAPEX commitments made today are not due to deliver revenues for several 
years, by which time the policy context could be very different.
•  Diversified mining companies have alternative revenue streams and 
opportunities; but pure coal companies are very exposed.
HSBC: Coal & Carbon (June 2012)
Global coal demand needs to fall from 2020 in a low-carbon world. This report 
examines the risks for the four UK listed mining majors. In a scenario in which 
coal demand no longer grew or went into decline, commodity prices would 
fall, negatively impacting producers with high costs of production. Overall, 
a no growth scenario from 2020 would cut the discounted cash flow (DCF) 
valuation of coal assets held by these companies by 44% today. The share 
price impact would, however, be reduced as these are diversified companies, 
implying reductions of 4-15%. The long lead-time for mining projects makes 
the potential impacts of future carbon constraints relevant to investors today; 
project appraisals for capital expenditure on coal need to be stress-tested for 
carbon. The volatility of the sector and the focus of analysts on the immediate 
means that any form of structural change around carbon is likely to come as 
a genuine surprise to the market.
Energy value chain
•  Challenging the assumption that China’s coal consumption will continue to rise 
indefinitely has major implications for the sector globally, with coal exporters 
fighting for a shrinking saturated market.
•  Companies which serve the fossil fuel industry will lose custom, and infrastructure 
requirements will be different.
•  Renewables players, gas utilities, cleantech companies and public transport 
providers will be winners.
•  Macroeconomic analysis covering interconnected sectors and geographies 
   is required to understand the full implications of carbon budgets for investors. 
Deutsche Bank (March 2013) China Strategy: Big bang measures 
to fight air pollution
This analysis demonstrates the feedback effects of addressing air quality 
on coal demand. Urban air quality has become a political issues in China and 
new measures to improve the situation are being introduced. This is confirmed 
by comments from the Chinese administration that coal use will peak within 
the current five year plan (which runs to 2017). The knock-on price effects of 
China becoming a net exporter of coal again mean that Pacific coal exporters 
would suffer. Energy intensive sectors would also see price rises. On the plus 
side, gas utilities, energy efficiency technology, public transport and renewables 
would be winners from this development. 
29Unburnable Carbon 2013: Wasted capital and stranded assets  | 
Where are stranded assets likely to occur and 
how can investors identify them in advance?
Companies will likely respond to falling commodity 
prices by delaying CAPEX and mothballing assets 
(mines, extraction wells and power plants) in the 
expectation that the price will rise in the future 
and they can be brought back into use. However 
a long-term low-carbon scenario will ultimately lead 
to closure of assets, decommissioning and if possible, 
sale of sites for alternative land use. 
A hierarchy of factors used in identifying candidates 
for closure would include:
•  Purchased/explored but not yet developed; 
•  Margin: inefficient plant/highest cost producers first 
to be mothballed or delayed;
•  High risk sites politically (North Africa) or technically 
(Arctic);
•  Ease of access to the market: local fuel sources may 
be preferable to exposure to geopolitical instability; 
•  Low remediation costs and/or potential for land use 
in other purposes would maximise resale value of 
the decommissioned site.
New developments would be put on hold – the 
reserves would remain ‘on the books’ but further cash 
would not be spent on them. The assets could be 
disposed of but this assumes there is still demand 
for them, which is unlikely in a contracting sector.
New performance metrics
Some of the core indicators used for these sectors 
need updating if a better picture of the position 
of a company in a carbon-constrained world is to 
be obtained. Especially as many indicators need 
to be inverted from their current approach.
Reserves replacement ratio (RRR): currently 
companies are expected to at least replace the 
reserves expended through production – either 
through exploration or acquisition. Maintaining 
a RRR above 100% is rewarded as an indicator 
of future revenues. 
Applying carbon budgets to 
reserves inverts the dynamic of 
the RRR, and could be converted 
into a reserves redundancy ratio.
Returns on invested capital (ROIC): each oil 
company has a track record of achieving a rate or 
return on capital employed. For a number of years 
oil majors have seen rising costs which have been 
hidden by the oil price ratcheting up. This has 
preserved margins, but leaves the oil companies 
vulnerable to lower prices. The peak oil demand 
scenario would put pressure on ROIC, exposing 
the weakness in assuming that future performance
will repeat the past.
Conclusions
•  Peak demand will lead to falling prices putting 
pressure on margins and projects with the highest 
breakeven costs. Maintaining levels of return on 
capital will be increasing difficult.
•  Traditional metrics such as the reserves replacement 
ratio have traditionally rewarded investment in 
replenishing stocks of fossil fuels. If the market 
switches, this will flip this indicator such that 
replacement is no longer desirable.
•  A range of factors from air quality regulation, 
and falling renewable costs, to water availability 
are changing the energy markets, without global 
regulation yet in place.
•  Utilities face uncertainty over the lifetime of 
generation plants with market mechanisms such 
    as carbon prices contributing to this. As a result they 
are vulnerable to impaired assets.
Recommendations
•  Analysts need to use a range of assumptions 
   to stress-test their valuation outputs.
•  The traditional metrics such as reserves replacement 
ratio need to be replaced or reversed to reflect 
   a carbon-constrained world.
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4.2 Debt
The 200 companies analysed have total outstanding 
corporate debt (bonds and loans) of $1.27trillion. 
This is split 74% for oil and gas companies with 26% 
for coal mining companies’ debt (based on revenues 
derived from coal).
The following section looks at the oil and gas, mining 
and utilities sectors in turn to understand what sticking 
to carbon budgets means for how bonds are rated.
Coal
•  Pure coal mining companies are most vulnerable 
to changing operating conditions, especially those 
that are reliant primarily on domestic markets, eg 
US, South Africa.
•  A global deal on climate change or a carbon price 
are not essential to generate regulatory risk. Air 
quality measures are proving just as effective, 
 eg China, US.
•  The cost competitiveness of different technologies 
is constantly evolving. The gas-coal dynamic has 
been critical in the US. Renewables make it a three-
way fight in an increasing number of countries 
 eg Germany, Australia.
•  The speed at which the business model unravels 
shows coal’s vulnerability in a contracting market.
•  The ability of some companies to refinance their 
debt when it matures in the next few years may be 
impinged.
Carbon Tracker (April 2013) US coal 
vulnerability
In the first half of 2012, US coal demand was at 
its lowest for 25 years. Cheap gas prices were 
compounded by the US EPA’s introduction of 
mercury emissions regulation which the market 
clearly did not believe would happen. 
As a result US coal mining companies saw 
downgrades:
Company
Company Corporate family 
credit rating (Moody’s)
Alpha Natural 
Resources
Dec 11: Ba2 
(stable)
June 12: B1 
(stable)
Arch Coal
Dec 11: Ba3 
(stable)
May 12: B1 
(negative)
Patriot Coal
Dec 11: B2 
(stable)
May 12: Caa1 
(stable)
Oil
•  Smaller companies with high exposure to oil 
sands are not resilient to the price stress of a peak 
demand scenario.
•  Cashflow pressure could impact dividends and 
result in the cancellation of projects, creating 
stranded assets.
•  The longer term climate policy, technology and 
impact risks are not included in the typical three 
year rating horizon. 
•  Financial models that only rely on past performance 
and creditworthiness are an insufficient guide 
 for investors.
Standard & Poor’s (Feburary 2013) What 
a carbon constrained future could mean 
for oil companies’ creditworthiness
S&P reviewed the credit-worthiness of companies 
with exposure to Canadian oil sands in a low oil 
price situation. The falling oil price was used to 
reflect the reducing demand that would result 
from measures to reduce oil demand, such as 
those being introduced on vehicle efficiency in 
North America. This stress scenario showed that 
smaller companies with high exposure to oil sands 
see their creditworthiness affected even within the 
typical three year ratings horizon. This scenario 
puts pressure on cashflows which may result in 
dividends being cut or projects being cancelled. 
The results show that for the smaller companies, 
we see a deterioration in the financial risk profiles 
of these companies to a degree that would 
potentially lead to negative outlook revisions and 
then downgrades over 2014-2017. Beyond this 
the business models of these companies unwinds 
further as there is no case for continuing to invest 
capital into developing unviable reserves.
Utilities
•  The uncertainty around the future of fossil fuels 
 is greater in some markets than it is for renewables.
•  Decentralisation of power generation can reduce 
the available market for traditional utilities.
•  Traditional business models are no longer viable in 
energy markets which encourage decarbonisation – 
companies need to adapt to survive.
•  Non-carbon factors such as water availability add 
 to the complexity of understanding the viability 
 of future large-scale generation, eg China, India.
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Moody’s (November 2012) European 
Utilities: Wind and Solar Power Will 
Continue to Erode Thermal Generators’ 
Credit Quality
Germany is already experiencing the pressure 
that competition of distributed solar power and 
subsidised wind power is putting on centralised 
fossil power stations. With renewable energy 
meeting 26% of demand in 2012, and targets of 
35% by 2020 on track to be exceeded, coal and 
gas power stations are struggling to maintain 
load factors of baseload plant (~75%) and are 
at times pushed to act as back up capacity to 
the renewable generators. Large increases in 
renewable energy have had a profound negative 
impact on power prices and the competitiveness 
of thermal generation in Europe. What were once 
considered stable companies have seen their 
business models severely disrupted. Given that 
further increases in renewables are expected, 
these negative pressures will continue to erode 
the credit quality of thermal based utilities in the 
near to medium term.
Updated methodologies
Ratings agencies need to review and evolve their 
methodologies to reflect emerging issues. We 
consider climate change to be the equivalent of 
corporate pension fund liabilities. Previously it was 
just assumed that funds had sufficient assets to cover 
defined benefit liabilities. Then it emerged that there 
were some shortfalls, so analysts started adding this 
in. Now these figures are included on the balance 
sheet so that the complete picture is available. 
Recent work with credit ratings agencies has shown 
that the fundamentals of their methodologies relating 
to the financial strength of companies and the soundness 
of their business models can be impacted by climate 
risk. This makes a case for a more systematic 
stress-testing of credit ratings and an adjustment 
of approach to factor in the likelihood of alternative 
outcomes. Over time this should result in systematic 
coverage of the issue.
Looking forward
It is also clear that in order to avoid systemic risks in 
the future, investors will need information which looks 
forward. The nature of climate change means that the 
future is very unlikely to repeat the past, whichever 
pathway the world follows. Ratings agencies are 
realising that using historic performance to forecast 
future creditworthiness is becoming increasingly 
inadequate. It is time for investors to push for 
improved analysis and ratings agencies to respond 
to the challenge.
Improved oversight
The influence which credit ratings agencies have 
on the availability of capital is clear. With that power 
comes responsibility. Following the financial crisis, 
new regulations are being introduced to improve the 
quality of credit ratings. In the US, the Dodd-Frank 
Act established an office at the Securities & Exchange 
Commission which was set up to monitor the credit 
ratings agencies. In Europe, the European Securities 
and Markets Association (ESMA) has responsibility 
for supervision. But, to date, these new rules have 
not included the imperative of climate and wider 
sustainability risk.
Conclusions
•  Traditional business models are no longer viable in 
energy markets which encourage decarbonisation – 
companies need to adapt to survive.
•  The ability of some companies to refinance their 
debt when it matures in the next few years may be 
impinged.
•  The speed at which the business model unravels 
shows coal’s vulnerability in a contracting market.
•  Cashflow pressure could impact dividends and 
result in the cancellation of projects, creating 
stranded assets.
•  Financial models that only rely on past performance 
and creditworthiness are an insufficient guide for 
investors.
Recommendations
•  Investors need to exercise influence as ratings 
users to ensure the routine integration of climate 
factors in the assessment of business models and 
creditworthiness.
•  Regulators should ensure credit ratings agencies 
  are addressing climate change as part of their 
efforts to tackle systemic risk. 
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5. Implications for investors
5.1 Redefining risk 
Divergent scenarios
There is a major divergence between limiting global warming to 2°C and increasing 
emissions which result in 3,4,5 or even 6°C of warming. Fossil fuel sectors will 
obviously thrive if emissions are not restricted, but will be at risk of stranded assets 
in a carbon-constrained world. The flip side of this is that climate-sensitive sectors 
such as agriculture, property, infrastructure, forestry, water, and those that rely 
on these sectors through supply chains will experience the opposite fortunes 
to carbon-intensive activities.  
Perhaps the most significant observation is that both of these impacts are already 
occurring at the margins as the pathway economies are taking is not clear. Investors 
are already starting to question the validity of some coal-related investments. 
Similarly supply chains are being disrupted by flooding (eg semi-conductors 
in Thailand). This results in the message that putting your head in the sand should 
no longer be an option for institutional investors. They need to be able to articulate 
what their strategy is to manage risk in this situation and what their assumptions 
are around which risks are more likely.
Value at risk
Institutional investors are rightly concerned about managing risks to their portfolios. 
Sometimes the narrow definition of the risk can prevent investors taking forward-
looking action based on future risks. Instead risk is usually defined as deviation 
from the benchmark rather than the probability of an absolute loss in value. Either 
directly or indirectly this results in funds reflecting the composition of the market 
in order to reduce the risk of significantly deviating from the trajectory of the market. 
This leaves fund managers some license to overweight or underweight specific 
companies within a sector, but is likely to result in the sectoral composition 
mirroring the benchmark. This is one reason why it is difficult for investors to 
respond to demands to divest wholesale from a sector. Institutional investors 
would have to issue a specific mandate which chose to override the market norms 
with a policy decision to avoid certain activities. The analysis in the earlier chapters 
shows there is still large amounts of fossil fuels tied up in the benchmarks.
Given the divergence between the different levels of emissions going forward, 
different tools may be needed. It is perfectly feasible to produce valuations based 
on different assumptions around future emissions levels, which can then produce 
a range of potential stock prices. 
Probabilities can then be assigned to these outcomes dependent on the 
investor’s beliefs on the trajectory we are heading. A simplified example of this 
approach is presented in the box in the next page. As most valuation models 
are based on a repeat of historical performance and business as usual, it seems 
safe to assume that any such adjustment would be downward for most fossil 
fuel-based companies. 
IEA Scenarios for primary energy demand of coal
Source: IEA World Energy Outlook
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Turning the temperature down
A current valuation model is based on historical 
levels of demand and gives a valuation of a 
company share at $100. Let us consider this the 
equivalent of a 6°C valuation.
If different assumptions which reflect lower 
demand and prices are run this gives alternative 
valuations of:
•  $60 a share as a 4°C valuation
• $40 a share as a 2°C valuation
Different investors or actuaries can then assign 
value based on the probabilities they attribute 
to each potential outcome:
6°C 4°C 2°C
Value 
per 
share
Historical 
approach
100% 0% 0% $100
Investor A 60% 20% 20% $80
Investor B 20% 60% 20% $64
Investor C 20% 20% 60% $56
This simple illustration shows that even adding 
alterative outcomes at low probability can shift the 
valuation. It gives an indication of the implications 
of the potential 40-60% of market capitalisation 
indicated at risk in HSBC’s oil and carbon analysis.
Dealing with uncertainty 
There needs to be more demand through the 
investment chain from strategic asset allocation 
through to fund management to understand what 
investing for a 2°C world looks like. It is also clear 
that there is a large degree of uncertainty around 
the future. Investment tools therefore need to find 
ways of dealing with uncertainty rather than assuming 
everything will conform to models based on the past. 
This reflects the complexity of the issues that will 
affect our energy future, which do not boil down 
to a simple carbon price. 
5.2 Keep doing the maths 
In the original Unburnable Carbon analysis in 2011, 
Carbon Tracker invited people to do the maths 
of comparing carbon budgets to coal, oil and gas 
reserves. A range of organisations including the IEA, 
HSBC, Moody’s and 350.org accepted this challenge 
and started applying the numbers. 
The research conducted by the Grantham Research 
Institute, LSE, confirms that the numbers don’t add 
up, even in the most optimistic scenario and assuming 
CCS makes the maximum contribution. Listed 
companies have a carbon budget deficit compared 
to the reserves their business models are based on.
And for investors following the market, the numbers 
show the markets are heading in the wrong direction:
•  Up to $647bn in wasted capital is spent each year 
towards finding more reserves;
•  Potential reserves could double the level of listed 
company exposure to 1541GtCO2;
•  New York’s fossil fuel reserves grew 37%; London’s 
7% over the last two years.
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5.3 Capital flows revisited
Putting the financial numbers on the system it is clear that the multiple cycles 
of capital which facilitate the development of more coal, oil and gas will have 
to be rebalanced if we are to comply with a sensible carbon budget. The inevitable 
feedback of restricting emissions means a rebalancing and redistribution of funds 
is required to protect shareholders interests, prevent wasted capital and avoid 
stranded assets. Bloomberg NEF estimate investment in clean energy needs 
to double to over $500bn per annum. Greater understanding of the uncertainty and 
risk around fossil fuels can help make investment in alternatives more attractive.
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5.4 Options for investors In terms of active stewardship of equities, there are a range of approaches which 
reflect the different investment approaches and cultures across the world.
What can institutional investors do
Regulation: Firstly investors need to 
ensure that the market frameworks 
they are operating in are conducive 
to tackling the issue of systemic 
climate change risk. The current 
contradiction on the markets shows 
that regulators need to improve 
transparency of the future emissions 
which companies are relying on 
to deliver the revenues they are 
predicting. 
Engage: Engagement is a popular 
approach, however the fundamental 
shift in business model needed for 
these companies will require clear 
direction from investors. This will 
require interventions that challenge 
the capital investment strategy of the 
company going forward. Investors 
will need to feel strongly enough 
to make a clear requirement for a 
change of direction by the company, 
rather than pushing for slightly 
greener business as usual.
Return: A more mainstream 
approach which has been seen 
recently in the extractives sectors is 
for shareholders to push for share 
buybacks which boost the share 
price, or increased dividends which 
increase income. This shows that the 
company recognises it doesn’t have 
a better plan for the capital than to 
return it to shareholders.
Divest: This is the ultimate sanction 
for many investors which would 
require some of the previous options 
to have been exhausted, and may 
only apply to the most extreme 
cases where companies have refused 
to take other action. This may 
require investors to believe that the 
company’s strategy puts value at risk. 
Risk: Using some alternative 
measures of value at risk will change 
the rules of the game for investors. If 
systemic risks such as climate change 
are to be avoided, then investors will 
have to go beyond the traditional 
definition of risk as underperforming 
the benchmark.
Resolution: Where engagement 
is not fruitful, US shareholders 
in particular, file shareholder 
resolutions to put the issue on 
the agenda. Few shareholder 
resolutions achieve the necessary 
levels of support to direct the 
board to take action. However the 
process, dialogue and publicity can 
contribute to generating pressure 
for change which can result in a 
response from the company.
Re-distribute: Extracting capital 
from developing more fossil fuels 
then requires the asset owners 
to use it in low-carbon or non-
energy investments which are 
well-placed for a low-carbon future. 
Some companies are already 
repositioning their businesses to 
support mitigation of emissions 
or be resilient to climate change 
impacts. Work is ongoing to develop 
investment products which fulfil the 
investment needs of institutional 
investors (eg the Climate Bonds 
Initiative).
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6. The road ahead: 
conclusions and 
recommendations
Taking away the punchbowl 
Over the past two years, awareness of the 
contradiction between climate policy and capital 
markets has grown within the investment community 
and among policymakers. But this awareness has 
not yet been translated into a repricing of assets 
or a redirection of capital. As a result, the exposure 
of the world’s largest stock exchanges to the risk 
of unburnable carbon has grown not declined.
The first Unburnable Carbon report was written in 
the wake of the global financial crisis, which provided 
a painful reminder of how markets can overshoot 
economic fundamentals, creating bubbles which 
eventually result in an implosion of valuations. Many 
lessons have been learned from this continuing shock 
to the global economy but three are particularly 
relevant for how markets now need to change 
to respond to the climate change challenge. 
•  First, regulators were insufficiently active in 
preventing the build-up of unsustainable asset 
bubbles, failing to ‘take away the punchbowl’ 
 as markets over-heated;
•  Second, institutional investors exercised insufficient 
stewardship over the assets in their portfolios, 
resulting in ‘ownerless corporations’ focused 
 on short-term returns;
•  Third, professionals along the investment chain, 
 from actuaries through analysts to auditors and  
 beyond, deployed inadequate attention to the 
 overall integrity of the market, privileging  
 immediate returns.
This report has confirmed that global markets are 
continuing to allocate scarce financial resources 
to the development of fossil fuel reserves that are 
incompatible with climate security. Learning the 
lessons of the last financial crisis means taking 
a structural approach to climate change on the 
world’s markets ahead of time. 
Overcoming systemic gridlock
The rules and norms that govern and guide global 
markets were designed in an era before climate 
change became a global priority. Companies are still 
rewarded for finding and developing new fossil fuel 
reserves; market risks are still assessed as if global 
average temperatures are not rising at unprecedented 
rates; and market participants still focus on historic 
drivers of asset values even through climate change 
means that the past really is not a useful guide to the 
future for key sectors such as energy. One powerful 
explanation of this disconnect is that markets do not 
believe that governments are serious about delivering 
the policies needed to drive down carbon emissions; 
until these are in place business as usual will continue 
largely unchecked. 
Over the past decade, leading institutional investors 
have started to integrate climate factors into their 
strategies. But looking across the industry, it has so far 
only rarely made it past being an inconvenient add-on 
to the average fund. But the systemic nature of the 
climate problem means that there are few incentives 
for investors to move much ahead of the pack 
resulting in gridlock. 
Clearly, governments need to put in place credible 
climate policies in the run-up to the finalisation of 
a new global agreement in 2015 that shifts investor 
attention in a low-carbon direction. But this needs 
to be matched by reform of capital market frameworks 
to enable investors to read these long-term signals 
and take appropriate action. For each of the key 
conclusions of this report, we have identified specific 
recommendations for action over the next two years 
for policymakers, regulators, investors and investment 
intermediaries.
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Conclusion Recommendation
Only a fraction of fossil fuels can be burnt 
unmitigated if we are to limit global 
warming.
Policymakers: need to ensure emissions limits are translated into clear signals for the financial markets.
Finance ministers: the G20 should extend its work to phase-out fossil fuel subsidies and develop 
an action plan to reduce high carbon exposure on financial markets.
The levels of fossil fuels listed on the world’s 
stock exchanges are increasing, especially in 
London (coal) and New York (oil).
Financial regulators: require companies to disclose the potential emissions of CO2 embedded 
in fossil fuel reserves; incorporate climate change risk into the assessment and monitoring of systemic 
risk in capital markets.
Investors: call for financial regulator to address climate change as a systemic risk to markets.
Companies are spending capital on finding 
more reserves, even though the current 
reserves exceed the carbon budget.
Investors: challenge the strategies of companies who are using shareholder funds to develop high costs fossil 
fuel projects; review the cash deployment of companies whose strategy is to continue investing in exploring 
for and developing more fossil fuels and seek its return; reduce holdings in carbon intensive companies and 
use re-balanced, carbon adjusted indices as performance benchmarks; redistribute funds 
to alternative opportunities aligned with climate stability.
Company reporting on strategy does not 
address the risk to business models of 
emissions constraints.
Regulators: require companies to explain how their business model is compatible with achieving emissions 
reduction targets given the associated reductions in price and demand that could result.
Equity analysis is not pricing in the risk of an 
emissions ceiling and traditional indicators 
are not suited to a contracting market.
Investors: exercise power as the client to demand alternative research which prices in the impact 
of different emissions pathways on valuation.
Analysts: develop alternative indicators which stress-test valuations against the potential that future 
performance will not replicate the past.
Credit ratings are not systematically 
considering the risk of an emissions ceiling.
Investors: exercise influence as ratings users to demand alternative ratings which consider the impact 
of different emissions pathways on creditworthiness and business models.
Regulators: ensure credit ratings agencies are addressing climate change as part of their efforts 
to tackle systemic risk.
Ratings agencies: rise to the challenge of integrating systematic assessment of climate risk 
into sector methodologies to provide forward looking analysis.
Investors are tied into benchmarks rather 
than understanding their exposure to risk.
Investment advisers: redefine risk to reflect the value at risk based on the probability of future scenarios, 
rather than the risk of deviating from the benchmark.
Actuaries: review the way pensions are valued to factor in the probabilities of different emissions scenarios.
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